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LAW AND THE DEMISE
OF THE URBAN GHETTO*
S EGREGATION IN HOUSING, and the impacted racial ghetto to which
it gives rise, together constitute the most explosive and pervasive
social, economic and political problem facing this nation today." I
Despite recent legislation concerning civil rights, medical care, hous-
ing and education, the atmosphere within our black ghettos is presently
pervaded with a deep sense of bitterness and despair. 2  One com-
mentator on the black ghetto has attempted to describe its dimensions
in the following manner:
The objective dimensions of the American urban ghettos are
overcrowded and deteriorated housing, high infant mortality, crime,
and disease. The subjective dimensions are resentment, hostility,
despair, apathy, self-depreciation, and its ironic companion, com-
pensatory grandiose behavior.3
Housing segregation has been singled out as an essential link
in the circular chain of discrimination and lost opportunity; employ-
ment is dependent, at least in part, on education, education on
neighborhood schools and housing, housing on income, and income
on employment.4  This de facto segregation has resulted in the
alienation of the black community from the mainstream of American
life. The awesome magnitude of this racial isolation is not generally
recognized. The overwhelming majority of black and white Amer-
icans still reside in wholly segregated communities as evidenced by
the compilation of a "national segregation index," revealing that
over eighty-six percent of the non-white urban population would
have to move their residence to all white neighborhoods in order
*This paper was prepared by the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rts. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 1408 (1966) (hereinafter cited as 1966
Hearings Before the Subcomnni. on Const. Rts.).
2 Id.
3J. CLARK, DARK GHETTO 11 (1965).
4 Hearings Before Subconun. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2nd Sess. ser. 16, at 1053 (1966) (hereinafter cited as 1966
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5).
to reduce the index to zero.'
This ghetto phenomenon does not rep-
resent a voluntary grouping of people
electing to live together at their own
pleasure.6 The United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights recognized that hous-
ing is the one marketable commodity not
freely available on equal terms to black
Americans, regardless of their personal
worth or, ability to pay.7  It noted that
"'[t]he dollar in a dark hand' does not
'have the same purchasing power as a
dollar in a white hand.' "s Similarly,
a recent investigation, utilizing census data
to examine the relationship between pov-
erty and housing segregation, concluded
that black Americans, regardless of their
economic status, "rarely live ii white
residential areas, while whites, no mat-
ter how poor, rarely lived in Negro
residential areas." 9
Mr. Justice Douglas recently observed
that the true curse of the institution of
slavery has fallen not upon the black
man, but upon the white man.' 0 It was
this institution which gave impetus to
the theory of white intellectual and moral
superiority. This attitude has so per-
meated the American psyche that race
relations have generally been governed by
5 1966 Hearings Before the Subcommn. on
Const. Rts. at' 1408.
Gld. at 1410.
7 1961 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, pt. 4, Housing, at 1.
S Id. See also G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA 618-27 (1944); 1959 REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
pt. 4, Housing, at 336-98.
1 1966 Hearings Before the Subconnl. on
Const. Rts. at 1410.
10'Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
445 (1968) (concurring opinion).
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status. Indeed, there is a nexus be-
tween the low status of the black Amer-
ican and residential segregation. Since
neighborhoods are evaluated as being
either higher or lower in status,"1 resi-
dential segregation occurs in part be-
cause whites do not wish to live near
black Americans for fear of losing
status.'2 This disparagement of the black
community serves to reinforce the lower
caste status of the black American. 1
Furthermore, poor housing has had a
profound psychological effect upon the
black personality. "If the Negro has to
identify with a rat-infested tenement, his
sense of personal inadequacy and in-
feriority . . . is reinforced by the phys-
ical reality around him." 14
Residential segregation also creates
segregated schools. The United States
Commission on Civil Rights reported in
1967 that segregation in the public
schools had increased during the past
fifteen years, due largely to the growth
of the black ghetto and the movement
of whites to the suburbs.'" Segregation
',Duncan, Residential Distribution and Occu-
pational Stratification, 60 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY
493, 503 (1955).
12 Wolf, The Invasion-Succession Sequence as
a Self-Fulling Prophesy, 13 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES
7, 20 (1957); Mayer, Race and Private Hous-
ing: A Social Problem and a Challenge to
Understanding Human Behavior, 13 J. OF
SOCIAL ISSUES 3, 6 (1957).
" For an extensive discussion of the black
American's lower caste status, see G. MYRDAL,
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 669-93 (1944).
14j. CLARK, DARK GHETTO 32-33, n.53 (1965).
15 1967 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Racial Isolation in
the Public School 8, 199.
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in education has had a catastrophic effect,
both culturally 10 and psychologically 17
upon black students. Inferior education,
in turn, affects the black American's
ability to compete equally in the em-
ployment market. In addition, racial seg-
regation in our education system has
aggravated the deep sense of racial alien-
ation existing in our society, during those
years when interracial contact is essential
to the abandonment of the stereotyped
image of the black American. 8
It is not surprising then that ghetto
residents have become alienated from the
mainstream of our society. 'Their re-
sponse to the ghetto environment has in-
creasingly taken the form of collective
violence. We have seen recent evidence
of this development in the riots which
have plagued the urban ghetto each sum-
mer. It has now been recognized that
until the racial ghettos of this country
are eliminated and the black American
empowered to live wherever he chooses,
the racial discontent so in evidence in
recent days will continue to disrupt
American life.19 In addition to obvious
social, economic, and political obstacles
which must be overcome before the
ghettos' walls of fear and suspicion can
be breached, several judicial and consti-
tutional problems must also be resolved.
In recent months, it has been this latter
1 Id.
17 Id. at 104. See also Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).-
IS 1967 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COM-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at
110.
9 1966 Hearings Before Subcommn. No. 5 at
1054.
area in which the most dramatic and ef-
fective progress has been made. In April,
1968, Congress enacted Title VIII of the
1968 Civil Rights Act°20 a comprehen-
sive fair housing section, prohibiting pri-
vate discrimination in the sale and rental
of housing. The constitutional obstacles
confronting Title VIII will be discussed
in Part 11 of this article. Part I will
examine the' recent Supreme Court re-
evaluation of the thirteenth amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 1
Part I: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
Petitioners in Jones had inspected a
model home in Paddock Woods, the site
of the respondents' privately owned hous-
ing subdivision. Their offer to purchase
such a home was rejected by agents of
the respondents, who stated their general
policy of refusing to convey homes or
lots to -black Americans.22 The petition-
ers then sought damages and injunctive
relief against respondents, contending
that their discriminatory act was prohib-
ited since sufficient state involvement was
present, in the form of assistance and
regulations, to satisfy the "state action"
requirement of the fourteenth amend-
ment, or alternatively, that the develop-
ment of housing subdivisions by the re-
spondents was a governmental function
equivalent to "state action." 2 The dis-
20Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
21392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2" Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 255 F.
Supp. 115, 118 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
231n as much as the case arose on the re-
spondents' motion to dismiss, the facts pleaded
in the petitioners' complaint were accepted as
true. Bonnot v. Congress of Independent Unions,
trict court, however, rejected these con-
tentions and granted the respondents'
motion to dismiss. 2 4  The decision was
affirmed on appeal by the Eighth Cir-
cuit.2 5 While the United States Supreme
Court did grant certiorari, a final decision
on the petitioners' contentions regarding
"state action" was avoided when the
court dramatically seized upon the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to sustain their com-
plaint.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866
The resolution for a constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery was de-
bated in both the First and Second Ses-
sions of the Thirty-Eighth Congress.2 6
Local No. 14, 331 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1964).
Sufficient facts were present in these allegations to
establish a strong case on either theory. Pad-
dock Woods would eventually house over one
thousand people and was only a part of a
large complex of similar housing subdivisions
previously developed by the respondents.
Many of these previous subdivisions were par-
tially financed by the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration. The developer had laid out
streets for the use of the residents and had
undertaken to provide such community service
as garbage collection. The St. Louis County
Planning Commission had approved its plans
and had agreed to provide sewer installation
and service. The respondent corporate real
estate broker had been licensed by the state.
The developer had also appointed a board of
trustees to provide community services, grant-
ing them the legal authority to levy assess-
ments and to enforce them through judicial
action.
24255 F. Supp. at 119-129.
25Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 379
F.2d 33, 44 (8th Cir. 1967).
21 It was approved by the Senate on April 18,
1864, and by the House on January 31, 1865.
It became law on December 18, 1865, abolish-
ing slavery for all time. Clyatt v. United
States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
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An examination of the debates on the
amendment indicates that both the pro-
ponents and the opponents of this amend-
ment realized it did much more than
simply abolish the institution of slavery. ' 7
Indeed, it was argued that it was such a
drastic extension of the power of the
federal government that the federal char-
acter of the government would be de-
stroyed.28 Similarly, it was assumed that
the incidents of slavery were likewise
abolished and that Congress could legis-
late to guarantee and protect the rights
created for the black American by the
amendment.2 9  The second section had
been included in the amendment for the
express purpose of removing all doubts
about the power of Congress to abolish
such incidents.30  One commentator has
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1366, 2616, 2940-41, 2692, 2986 (1864);
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 178-180,
182, 192-95, 239, 241-42, 480-81, 529 (1865).
2SSee, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2941 (1864).
21 Id. at 1202. Until the Court's determination
of the question in Jones, some doubt had
existed whether the amendment was originally
intended to provide Congress with the power
to prohibit incidents imposed by purely pri-
vate conduct. The debates of the commenta-
tors on this issue have been both exhaustive
and eloquent. See, e.g., Avins, The Civil Rights
Act of 1866, The Civil Rights Bill of 1966,
and The Right to Buy Property, 40 S. CAL. L.
REV. 274 (1967); Gressman, The Unhappy
History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH.
L. REV. 1323 (1952); ten Broek, Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1951).
:"'Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, ex-
plained the inclusion of the second section
in the amendment with the following remarks:
"And, sir, when the constitutional amendment
shall have been adopted, if the information
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observed that the amendment was pre-
sented at that time, not as the first of a
series of amendments designed to achieve
racial equality, but as the final step, the
"joyous consummation of abolition." 31
Nevertheless, the need for statutory
enforcement of the amendment, as pro-
vided for in its second section, soon be-
came apparent. As a result, the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was enacted.3 2  It
provided in pertinent part:
That all persons born in the United
States . . . are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slav-
ery or involuntary servitude . . . shall
have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
from the South be that men whose liberties
are secured by it are deprived of the privi-
lege to go and come when they please, to buy
and sell when they please, to make contracts
and enforce contracts, I give notice that, if
no one else does, I shall introduce a bill and
urge its passage through Congress that will
secure to those men every one of these rights;
they would not be free men without them."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
31 TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 162-63
(1965).
32Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27. This Act was subsequently codified
in §§ 1977, 1978 of the Revised Statutes of
1874, now 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982. Section
1982, under which the Jones action was
brought, simply reads: "All citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."
personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens . . . any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom notwithstanding.
President Andrew Johnson vetoed the
Act, but both the Senate and the House
quickly overrode his veto and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 became law.33
A variety of other bills seeking to pro-
vide appropriate relief was introduced
during the First Session of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress." Congress chose in-
stead to enact a statute which both out-
tined and guaranteed certain rights for
black Americans." It was this use of the
term "right", however, which was to con-
fer a large degree of ambiguity upon the
scope of the statute. The "right" granted
may merely have been a right to equal
status under the law, operating only to
prohibit discrimination sanctioned by
"state action." Numerous statements in
the legislative debates lend support to
': CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679-81
(1866).
34 Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, for
example, sponsored a bill declaring as void all
laws establishing any inequality of civil rights
based on color or previous slavery. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865).
Senator Charles Summer of Massachusetts in-
troduced a bill granting the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction of all suits to which a
person of African descent was a party. Id.
at 91-95.
,9 The enumeration of these rights is derived
from the summary of the fundamental privi-
leges of national citizenship in Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 547 (No. 3230)
(E.D. Pa. 1823).
such an interpretation. 3G  However, the
debates also contain some evidence that
many members of Congress, the radical
republicans in particular, utilized the term
"right" in a much broader sense. Sev-
eral congressmen expressed a desire to
provide protection for the "inherent" and
"natural" rights of the black Americans,
including the right to acquire property.37
Representative Wilson stated "[t]he en-
tire machinery of our government . . .
was designed, among other things, to se-
cure a more perfect enjoyment of these
rights." "I Such "natural" or "inherent"
rights, existing prior to the formation of
our government, could certainly be vio-
lated by purely private discrimination. 39
To be balanced against such an inter-
pretation, however, are the numerous
statements in the debates which seem to
limit the application of the Act to situa-
tions in which an element of "state ac-
tion" is involved. 0 Representative Bing-
ham stated that the purpose of the Act
was "to strike down every State constitu-
tion which makes a discrimination on
3- CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476,
478, 504, 601-03, 1118-19, 1122-23, 1151-53,
1160, 1291, 1293-94, 1760 (1866).
37ld. at 41, 1757, 1118-19, 1833.
3', Id. at 1118-19.
3 See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
HARV. L. REV. 63, 99-100 (1968).
4" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476,
478, 504, 601-03, 1118-19, 1122-23, 1151-53,
1160, 1291, 1293-94, 1760 (1866). The en-
forcement provisions contained in the second
section of the Act were applicable only to
"state action." It is sometimes difficult to
determine if a particular speaker's remarks
on "state action" are referring 'to the whole
Act or merely its ,second, section. See, e.g.,
id. at 1294.
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account of race or color. . . ." .1 It is
admitted that the "Black Codes" enacted
by the southern states after the War,
were a major factor in the congressional
decision to enact the 1866 Act.42 But,
in addition, the debates also contained
numerous references to acts of private
discrimination against black Americans,
by white employers who refused to pay
them, by assaults upon them and their
homes, and by conspiracies to prevent
their employment.4 3  Senator Davis of
Kentucky, objecting to the breadth of
the bill, stated:
[tlhis measure proscribes all discrimina-
tions against Negroes in favor of white
persons that may be made anywhere in
the United States by any 'ordinance,
regulation or custom,' as well as by 'law
or statute.' 44
The proponents of the bill, in turn, de-
fended the propriety of using federal au-
thority to cope with "the white man . . .
[who] would invoke the power of local
prejudice" against the black American. 5
Once again, in the House of Repre-
sentatives, a substantial portion of the
debates centered around the elimination
of the "Black Codes." 46 Yet, there is
4 Ild. at 1291.
4 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409,
454-73 (1968) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan).
43 CONG. GLOBE,. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 95,
339-40, 1160, 1833, 1835 (1866).
I d. at App. 183.
4 ld. at 603.
"16Id. at 1218-19, 1123-25, 1151-53, 1160.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 464-73 (1968) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan).
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also evidence that the House, like the
Senate, was intent upon protecting the
freedom granted by the thirteenth amend-
ment. 47 Representative Thayer of Penn-
sylvania stated that that amendment was
no "mere paper guarantee;" 48 that its sec-
ond section had provided Congress with
the power to protect the rights granted
by the first. Similarly, Representative
Cook of Illinois warned that if Congress
failed to protect those rights, any "com-
bination of men in [a] neighborhood
[could] prevent [a black American] from
having any chance" 49 to enjoy them. He
concluded that Congress must act to in-
sure that "there . . . be no discrimination
on grounds of race or color" 50 in our
country.
Senator Trumbull, who introduced the
bill which later became the 1866 Act
onto the Senate floor, discussed his view
of Congressional power under section
two of the thirteenth amendment in these
terms: "I have no doubt that under this
provision of the Constitution we may
destroy all these discriminations in civil
rights against the black man. . ... He
continued, "I hold that we have a right to
pass any law which .. .will .. . secure
freedom to all people in the United
States." 52 Senator Trumbull was acutely
aware of the problems presented by pri-
vate discrimination. An examination of
his speeches does not reveal a pre-occu-
pation with the "Black Codes." Instead,
-17CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117,
1151-52, 1159, 1264 (1866).
isId. at 1151.
411ld. at 1124.
50 Id.
5t Id. at 322.
-2d. at 475.
one finds he constantly spoke of the
necessity to protect the freedom of black
Americans from "local legislation or a
prevailing public sentiment." -3 He felt
that the very object of the bill which he
had introduced was "to break down all
discrimination between black men and
white men." 54
Yet even Senator Trumbull's remarks
were not always entirely free of am-
biguity. For example, he once stated
that the Act would have no application
"in any State where the laws are equal,
where all persons have the same civil
rights without regard to color or race."5"
It is not entirely clear whether these
two exceptions are to be regarded as
being synonymous or distinct, although
the context in which the statement was
made does suggest the latter interpreta-
tion." Several of his other remarks ap-
pear to be equally consistent with a
"state action" interpretation.5 7 It is dif-
ficult, however, to reconcile such an in-
terpretation with the broad principles of
equality which he established as the ob-
jective of his proposed Act.
- id. at 77.
54 Id. at 599. Of like import are the remarks
of Senator Howard: "[I]n respect to all civil
rights . . . there is to be hereafter no distinc-
tion between the white race and the black
race." Id. at 504.
Id. at 476.
5(;At one point Senator Trumbull also re-
marked that the Act could have no operation
in those states whose laws did not discriminate
against the black American. Id. at 1761. How-
ever, in both instances, he may merely have
been observing that the Act would not have
any effect on nondiscriminatory state legisla-
tion.
57 Id. at 476, 600, 1758-61.
Re-Enactment Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
The Thirty-Ninth Congress also form-
ulated the fourteenth amendment, approv-
ing it in July, 1866. It was not ratified
by the states and did not become effec-
tive, however, until two years later, in
July, 1868. One of the main reasons for
the enactment of this amendment was to
remove all doubt concerning the constitu,
tional validity of the 1866 Act.'" Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson had challenged
Congress' power to decree that negroes
born in the United States were citizens
thereof, 9 thus in effect, overruling Dred
Scott v. Sandford °  This was an ex-
tremely critical objection since it was the
concept of national citizenship on which
the fundamental rights enumerated in the
1866 Act were granted.61 Senator Trum-
as Most courts which considered the question
had upheld the constitutionality of the Act.
See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (No. 14,247)
(C.C. Md. 1867); United States v. Rhodes,
27 F. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151) (C.C. Ky. 1866);
People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869);
Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866); Hart v.
Hoss & Elder, 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874); There
were decisions to the contrary however. See
People v. Brody, 40 Cal. 198 (1870); Bowlin
v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 5 (1867). See also
ten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States, 39 CAL. L. REV.
171, 200-02 (1951).
.'!,See Gressman, The Unhappy History of
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323, 1332-33 (1952).
6060 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
61See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
41, 77, 474-75, 602, 1119, 1294, 1757,
1835-36 (1865-66). See also Fairman and
Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5, 16-18 (1949); Gressman, The Un-
happy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1952).
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bull believed the rights inherent in na-
tional citizenship included all those rights
protected under the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV of the Con-
stitution.'2 The first interpretation of that
clause, rendered in Corfield v. Coryell,G3
had held it to encompass all fundamental
rights, including "the right to acquire and
possess property of every kind." The
citizenship clause of the fourteenth
amendment served to cure all doubts con-
erning the citizenship of the black
American.
The movement to formulate the four-
teenth amendment was supplemented,
however, by another development. The
radical republicans in Congress had be-
come convinced that the rights secured
by the 1866 Act "should be placed be-
yond the power of shifting Congressional
majorities." 64 There was no doubt with-
in this group that the civil rights legisla-
tion was authorized by the thirteenth
amendment. They realized, however,
that the exercise of congressional power
6-See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
474-75, 600, 1757 (1866). At one point dur-
ing the debates on the 1866 Act, he stated:
"Then they will be entitled to the rights of
citizens. And what are they? The great funda-
mental rights set forth in this bill: the right
to acquire property, the right to go and come
at pleasure, the right to enforce rights in the
courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and
dispose of property. Id. at 475. See generally,
Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the
True Meaning of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1 (1967).
63 6 F. Cas. 546, 547 (No. 3230) (E.D. Pa.
1823).
64 See ten Broek, supra note 58, at 201. See
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459,
2462, 2465 (1866).
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to protect civil rights invaded an area
previously considered to be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the states.6 5 By
means of the fourteenth amendment, they
sought to firmly establish in the Consti-
tution the duty of the national govern-
ment to continue in this new protective
role, thus negating the possibility of its
abdication by any subsequent Congress. "6
The 1866 Act was later re-enacted under
the fourteenth amendment in the Civil
Rights Act of 1870.67
Subsequent Judicial Interpretation
of the 1866 Act
The fears of the radical republicans
concerning the possible abdication by the
federal government of its role in the area
of civil rights proved to be well war-
ranted. The glorious promise of equality
proclaimed by the post-War amendments
and the 1866 Act suffered a speedy de-
cline as the attention of the country be-
gan to shift to the more popular themes
of the westward movement and economic
expansion.68 The radical republicans no
longer dominated the Congress, and the
Compromise of 1877 marked the conclu-
sion of the reconstruction era.6 9 Then,
"'See ten Broek, supra note 58, at 190.
66 Id.
67Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat.
140, 144. Section 18 of this Act read:
"And be it further enacted, That the act
to protect all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and furnish the means of
their vindication, passed April nine, eighteen
hundred and sixty-six, is hereby re-enacted."
1 See Marshall, The Continuing Challenge of
the 14th Amendment, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 980,
984 (1968).
60 See J. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER
THE CIVIL WAR 212-17 (1961).
in 1883, the Supreme Court effectively
emasculated the work of the Reconstruc-
tion Congress with its decision in the
Civil Rights Cases.7 ° While the Court
invalidated only sections one and two of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875,7 1 which
prohibited private discrimination in the
area of public accommodations, its in-
terpretation of both the thirteenth amend-
ment and the 1866 Act, destroyed the
viability of each of those provisions. Mr.
Justice Bradley, writing for the majority,
adopted the position which has, until
recently, dominated American legal
thought in this area.7 2  He agreed with
the dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan, that
the thirteenth amendment abolished not
only slavery, but also all badges and in-
cidents of slavery, and that Congress had
direct and primary power to enforce its
provisions. The Justices differed, how-
ever, in their opinion of what constituted
a badge of slavery. Mr. Justice Bradley,
denied that racial discrimination against
black Americans in public life was re-
lated to their previous status as slaves.
Instead, he viewed the problem of racial
discrimination as an ordinary hazard of
70 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
71Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
.- As a result of his interpretation, the thir-
teenth amendment has played only a minor
and insignificant role in the development and
protection of civil rights. See, e.g., Corrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). Instead, it
has had its chief application in the area of
peonage or compulsory labor for debt. See,
e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1943);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911);
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
citizenship, similar to any arbitrary dis-
crimination against a white citizen. In-
deed, he urged at one point that it was
time to eliminate any preferred status
for the freed slaves.7 3
Mr. Justice Harlan contended that the
badges of slavery were designed to im-
press upon black Americans their status
as an inferior race. He recognized, as
the Taney Court had in the Dred Scott
case, that slavery as an institution rested
squarely upon what Chief Justice Taney
characterized as an "axiom in morals as
well as politics" 74 which governed all,
American life-that the black race was
inferior in all respects to the white race.
Mr. Justice Harlan reasoned that the
power to prohibit these badges of slavery
was necessarily correlative to the power
to abolish slavery itself.75  Mr. Justice
Bradley rejected this position, denying
that Congress had intended to adjust the
social rights of man. He stated that it
"would be running the slavery argument
into the ground to make it apply to every
act of discrimination which a person may
see fit to make . , 76
In addition, the Court advanced in
dicta the proposition that the re-enact-
ment of the 1866 Act under the four-
teenth amendment had limited its scope
to cases in which an element of "state
action" was involved.17  This "state ac-
tion" concept became a necessary ele-
73 109 U.S. at 25.
7460 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
7 See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of
Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387,
398 (1967).
76 109 U.S. at 24.
77 Id. at 16-17.
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ment in suits under the 1866 Act .7  For
example, a local zoning ordinance ..estab-
tablished the requisite "state action" in
Buchanan v. Warley,7' the first direct ap-
plication of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the suc-
cessor of the 1866 Act. The ordinance,
which prohibited members of either the
white or black race from living on a
block in which the other race predom-
inated, was held to be violative of both
section 1982 and the fourteenth amend-
ment. 0
Indications that section 1982 had be-
come infected with the fourteenth amend-
ment's limitations on "state action" again
appeared in Corrigan v. Buckley. 8' Plain-
tiffs had successfully enjoined a threat-
ened violation of racially restricted cove-
nants on real property.8 2 On appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court stat-
ed that while the thirteenth amendment
denounced slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, it "does not in other matters pro-
tect the individual rights of persons of
78The only exception was United States v.
Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903), in
which a federal district court held the 1866
Act to prohibit private discrimination in the
leasing of property. See also Hurd v. Hodge,
162 F.2d 233, 235, 240-41 (1947) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Edgerton).
7!245 U.S. 60 (1917).
SOld. at 79. See also the per curiam decisions
of the Court in Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S.
668 (1926), and Richmond v. Deans, 281
U.S. 704 (1929).. In Harmon, the Court in-
validated a New Orleans ordinance which pro-
hibited any black American from living in a
white community, or any white from living
in a -black community, without the written
consent of a majority of the persons of the
opposite race living in that community.
Sl271 U.S. 323 (1926).
82 55 App. D.C. 30, 299 F. 899 (1924).
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the negro race." "I The Court specifically
stated that section 1982 did not "in any
manner prohibit or invalidate contracts
entered into by private individuals in re-
spect to the control and disposition of
their own property." 84
The Court last considered the scope of
section 1982 twenty years ago, in Hurd
v. Hodge.s8 Again, white property own-
ers were seeking to enforce racially re-
strictive covenants against the purchase
of homes on their block by black Amer-
icans. The district court enforced the
covenants by declaring the deeds of the
black purchasers void and by enjoining
all further attempts to sell or lease them
the restricted property. 86  While Hurd
involved the action of private individuals,
the Supreme Court, on certiorari, did
find sufficient "state action" to satisfy
the traditional requirements of the four-
teenth amendment. The Court reversed
since a branch of the federal government,
a federal court, had assisted in the en-
forcement of the covenants.8 7
In Jones, petitioners had urged that
83271 U.S. at 330-31.
8, Id.
85 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
8'82 App. D.C. 180 (1946).
s See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I
(1948), in which the Court, in a unanimous
opinion, held section 1982 and the fourteenth
amendment to be co-extensive in prohibiting
the judicial enforcement of racially restricted
covenants for the benefit of third parties. Once
the vendor and vendee agreed to the con-
veyance, the Court held that the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 prohibited a state from enjoin-
ing the sale solely on the basis of the race
of one of the parties. See Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 330-31 (1964) (dissenting opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Black).
the 1866 Act had been enacted under
the thirteenth amendment, and since that
amendment is applicable to private ac-
tion, "state action" was not a necessary
element to a suit under that statute. Both
lower federal courts rejected this conten-
tion. s  The Supreme Court, in a 7-2
opinion, reversed, holding that the 1866
Act prohibited all racially motivated dis-
crimination in the sale of property. In
addition, the Act, thus interpreted, was
held to be a valid exercise of the con-
gressional power under the thirteenth
amendment to prohibit private discrim-
ination which imposed "badges of slav-
ery" upon black Americans.
The Court stated that the precise ques-
tion before it in Jones-whether purely
private discrimination, unaided by "state
action," would violate section 1982-had
never been squarely before the Court. It
dismissed its earlier indications that the
"state action" limitation applied to section
1982 as being mere dicta.si Difficulties,
however, were presented by the Corrigan
and Hurd decisions. Corrigan had re-
fused to declare a racially restrictive
covenant to be unconstitutional and void.
Hurd later characterized Corrigan as hav-
ing held that "the action toward which
the provisions of the statute . . . are
directed is governmental action." 9o The
Jones Court rejected this characteriza-
tion,' pointing out that Corrigan pre-
"8255 F. Supp. at 119; 379 F.2d at 43.
89 392 U.S. 409, 420-21, n.25 (1968).
!'Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority,
directly related the 1866 Act to the four-
teenth amendment and spoke of the "close
relationship" between the two. Id. at 32.
sented no claim that the covenants could
not validly be enforced. The only issue
presented was whether the covenants
themselves were violative of section 1982.
Even if Corrigan were regarded as an
adjudication that section 1982 did not
prohibit private citizens from agreeing
not to sell their property to black Amer-
icans, the Court noted that this would
not settle the question whether the sec-
tion prohibits an actual refusal to sell.
The Court indicated, however, that it
would be an error to regard Corrigan
as an adjudication even on that narrow
question, since it was not raised as an
issue before the Court by the appellants.
The majority and minority opinions
were bitterly divided over the legislative
history of the 1866 Act. Each opinion
presented quotations from the congres-
sional debates which were favorable to
its position, and the problems each had
in refuting the other's collection is indica-
tive of the ambiguity surrounding the
passage of that Act.Y2  The prevailing
spirit of the debates does not irrevocably
lend itself to either the minority or ma-
jortiy opinions. It is almost invariably
true of congressional debates that some
debaters will adopt extremely narrow
constitutional views of particular legisla-
tion, while others will adopt a much more
liberal position. The debates revolving
around the 1866 Act were no different.
The minority opinion of Mr. Justice Har-
''The Court stated "[biut no such statement
appears in the Corrigan opinion, and a careful
examination of Corrigan reveals that it cannot
be read as authority for the proposition at-
tributed to it in Hurd." 392 U.S. at 420, n.25
(1968).
9' 392 U.S. at 427-35, 454-73.
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]an was impressive in its attempt to re-
fute the majority's interpretation of the
debates. However, it was the majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart which
presented the more persuasive array of
debaters. Especially illuminating were
the speeches of Senator Trumbull and
the radical republicans,"3 whose efforts
had made the Reconstruction Congress
so effective. It is difficult to deny the
broad goals of equality and justice estab-
lished by these men. Mr. Justice Mar-
shall recently commented:
These men have borne through history
the name 'radicals.' . . Historians
have debated whether they were moved
primarily by their idealism or by various
economic motives. But whatever the un-
derlying reasons, they spoke the lan-
guage of freedom and equality and cre-
ated a powerful legal structure . . .
aimed at destroying the evils of dis-
crimination and injusticeY4
The Court also examined the text of
the Act, and found that it did not in any
manner indicate that its application was
to be restricted to discriminatory state
laws or conduct under color of law. '
') Id. at 429-34.
" See Marshall, supra note 68, at 982 (foot-
note omitted).
95Section two of the 1866 Act, enforcing the
first section, punishes only actions "under color
of law." Mr. Justice Bradley first questioned
in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 16-17,
why, if section one was meant to prohibit
private discrimination, section two was not
made applicable to such action. Representative
Loan had posed a similar question to Iowa's
Mr. Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, during the House debates on the
Act. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1120 (1866). Specifically, Loan asked "why
. . . limit the provisions of the second section
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Instead, the Court recognized that the
broad language of the Act was "no mere
slip of the legislative pen." '6 It had been
drafted to apply throughout the country,
and not merely in the confederate states.9 7
The Court also noted that it would have
been a relatively easier task for Congress
to simply prohibit all discriminatory state
laws without attempting to enumerate the
rights contained in the 1866 Act. 9
The Jones Court admitted that the
fourteenth amendment was enacted to
eliminate constitutional doubts confront-
ing the 1866 Act. Yet it stated quite
clearly that this provided no basis for
assuming that this was meant to limit its
application to "state action." The Court
pointed out that the legislative history
furnished not the slightest factual basis
to those who act under color of law?" Wilson
replied that they were not making "a general
criminal code for the States." Congress might
have desired to provide only civil remedies
for relief against private discrimination, re-
serving the criminal sanctions of section two
for state officials. See also Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 425 n.33 (1968).
It was a common occurrence in Recon-
struction legislation for provisions bearing only
against public officials and for provisions
punishing all discrimination to be merged in
one act. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1870,
§§ 4, 5, 6, 16 Stat. 140; Klu Klux Klan Act
of 1870, §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights
Act of 1875, §§ 1, 2, 4, 18 Stat. 335.
f' 392 U.S. at 427.
." The bill, on its face applied "in every State
and Territory in the United States." See also
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476, 505,
600, 1292 (1866).
f'I Indeed, three such proposals were dismissed
as too "narrowly conceived." See J. TEN
BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 177 (1965). See
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39,
91 (1865).
for any such speculation.99  By 1870,
when the 1866 Act was re-enacted, the
Confederate states, under the control of
the reconstruction forces, had prohibited
all racial discrimination, even in the pri-
vate sphere. 1°0 In light of this, the Court
correctly viewed congressional concern as
clearly shifting to the private outrages of
such groups as the Klu Klux Klan.'" It
concluded that it would be illogical to
assume that the 1870 re-enactment em-
bodied any silent decision to exempt pri-
vate discrimination from the operation of
the 1866 Act.' 0 2
") 392 U.S. at 436.
'() See STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN
AMERICAN LAW 115-16 (1910); 2 FLEMING,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION
285-88 (1907). See also Hall v. De Cuir, 95
U.S. 485 (1877); Sauvinet v. Walker, 92 U.S.
90 (1875).
101 See Civil Rights Act of 1870, §§ 4, 5, 6,
16 Stat. 140; Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871, § 2,
17 Stat. 131. See also United States v. Mosley,
238 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1915); United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 804-05 (1966); Collins v.
Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951); Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-76, 200 (1961).
See generally K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RE-
CONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, 198-204 (1965).
a( The original text of the 1866 Act, ending
with the words "any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwith-
standing," was dropped in the Revised Statutes
of 1874. This point was first raised in the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 16. The Jones
Court stated that the phrase was originally
inserted to emphasize the supremacy of the
1866 statute over inconsistent state or local
laws, and that it was deleted as surplusage
in 1874. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392
U.S. 409, 422-3 n.29 (1968). If the phrase
were read as one of limitation, it would seem
that the reference to local laws would make
the Act inoperative whenever the State acted
through its judicial or executive branches.
But see Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); McCabe
Implications of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
Jones may well represent the initial
step in a redefinition of the rights created
by the post-Civil War amendments. The
Court might easily have dismissed its writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted, in
view of the passage of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act.' 0' Another option open to
the Court was a finding of state action
sufficient to invoke the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 0 4  Instead, the Court seized this
opportunity to interpret a one hundred
year old statute as prohibiting all racial
discrimination, whether private or public,
in the sale and rental of property. This
necessitated a redefinition of the term
"right" in the 1866 Act. Prior to his
emancipation, the black American was
not regarded by the common law as pos-
sessing any civil rights.105 He was deemed
legally incapable of acquiring or holding
property.106 It was traditionally thought
that the 1866 Act merely embodied a
congressional attempt to grant the black
American the right to equal status under
the law. The Jones Court rejected this
v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151
(1914).
"1"392 U.S. at 477-80 (dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan).
1114 See supra note 23.
10°:See, e.g., Martin v. Reed, 37 Ala. 198
(1861); Levy v. Wise, 15 La. Ann. 38 (1860);
State v. Van Lear, 5 Md. 91 (1853); Jenkins
v. Brown, 25 Tenn. 299 (1845); Johnson v.
Barrett, 2 Bailey 562 (S.C. 1831).
100See, e.g., Curry v. Curry, 30 Ga. 253
(1860); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235
(1859); Sanders v. Deuereux, 25 Tex. Supp. 1
(1860); Weliber v. Kelley, 37 Ala. 333 (1861);
Folder v. Hendrick, 25 Mo. 411 (1857).
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characterization, stating that the statutory
text of the Act itself indicates that Con-
gress intended to grant more than a bare
legal capacity to acquire real property.
It grants in plain and unambiguous terms
to all citizens, without regard to race or
color, "the same right" to purchase and
lease property "as is enjoyed by white
citizens." The Court recognized that
there is implicit in these terms a guar-
antee of equal treatment, which is violat-
ed if the black American, although rec-
ognized as having the capacity to acquire
property, is in any manner disadvantaged
in the enjoyment of this right. The
Court concluded that as long as a black
American
who wants to buy or rent a home can
be turned away simply because he is not
white, he cannot be said to enjoy the
same right . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens . . . to . . . purchase [and] lease
. . . real and personal property. 107
This interpretation of the term "right"
may have an important impact in the
area of civil rights when it is applied to
the other guarantees of the 1866 Act. It
has been contended that this interpreta-
tion of the term "right" as an absolute
one, would reduce the statute to non-
sense.'08 One commentator termed it "a
striking novelty in American jurispru-
dence" ". to require a person to contract
107 383 U.S. at 421.
los See Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1866,
The Civil Rights Bill of 1966, and The Right
to Buy Property, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 274,
305-06 (1967).
109 Id. at 305.
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with someone he does not wish to con-
tract with; to force an unwilling testator
to bequeath his property; to enable a
seller to force an unwilling buyer to buy.
It is submitted, however, that the Court's
interpretation of the term "right" does
not deprive anyone of the right to con-
tract with, sell, or bequeath property to
whomever he chooses. Instead, it merely
deprives one of the right to discriminate
solely on the basis of race. Thus, a con-
tractor who offered his services on the
market could not discriminate in his
choice of customers solely on a racial
basis. An employer could not refuse to
enter into a contract of employment sim-
ply because the prospective employee is
a black American. Section 1982 would
also reach the case of a buyer, who, al-
though in the market for a particular
type of property, bases his refusal to
purchase from a seller solely on the lat-
ter's race. The same right to inherit ap-
plies to those situations in which the
testator bequeaths his property to the
public on a segregated basis.110 This in-
terpretation of the term "right" would
have rendered the search for "state ac-
tion' in Evans v. Newton "I unneces-
sary. It is unrealistic to contend that
these rights conferred by the 1866 Act
have been available to black Americans
for the past one hundred years. Rather,
1OSee, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 383 U.S. 296
(1966); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors,
353 U.S. 230 (1957); Pennsylvania v. Brown,
392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968).
111383 U.S. 296 (1966) (Firmly established
tradition of municipal control prohibited trans-
fer of segregated public park to private trustees.
Use of the park on this segregated basis had
been granted the city under a will).
the Court has now breathed new life into a
long dormant Act in an attempt to carry
out the original intentions of the Recon-
struction Congress.
As a result of this new interpretation
of the term "right," the Court necessarily
had to re-examine the scope of the thir-
teenth amendment in order to consider
the constitutionality of the redefined
statute. According to the majority, Con-
gress possesses the power under this
amendment to determine what are the
badges and incidents of slavery, and the
authority to pass corrective legislation in
those areas. The logical extension of this
view would seem to compel an overrul-
ing of the Civil Rights Cases. In that
case the Court concluded that "the act of
...the owner of the inn, the public con-
veyance or place of amusement, refusing
• . . accommodation" could not be "re-
garded as imposing any badge of slavery
or servitude upon the applicant." 1 2 The
Jones Court, however, refused to consider
the present validity of this position, treat-
ing the question as one rendered aca-
demic by Title II of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act." 3 Instead, it cited the Civil
Rights Cases as precedent. Quoting from
that case, the Court stated that Congress
had the " 'power to pass all laws neces-
sary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery. in the United
States.' " 114 Mr. Justice Bradley, writing
for the earlier Court, clearly meant that
Congress was empowered to guarantee
the black American equal status under
1"2 109 U.S. at 24.
113 392 U.S. at 441 n.78.
114 Id. at 439.
law. He had expressly rejected the prop-
osition that private discrimination was a
badge or incident of slavery. The Jones
Court also noted that the whole Court in
the Civil Rights Cases had agreed that
Congress possessed the power to enact
the 1866 Act. 1 5 However, the earlier
Court had certainly not regarded that Act
as prohibiting private discrimination
when it considered its constitutionality.
In order to resolve this conflict, it is
submitted that the Court will again have
to consider Mr. Justice Bradley's conten-
tion that racial discrimination can be un-
related to the institution of slavery.116
The possible limitations on Congressional
power under the thirteenth amendment
must be outlined. The meaning of the
phrase "badges of slavery" is the decisive
5Id. at 441 n.78.
"'i The Court did overrule Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). In Hodges, the
Court reversed a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
241 of a group of white men who had ter-
rorized several black Americans in order to
prevent them from working in a sawmill. The
Court recognized that the inability to make
or enforce contracts was a badge of slavery.
and that the defendants had deprived their
victims of this right. Yet the majority ruled
that "no mere personal assault . . . operates
to reduce the individual to a condition of
slavery." Id. at 18. The Hodges Court as-.
serted that only conduct which actually en-
slaves someone can be punished under legisla-
tion enacted under the thirteenth amendment.
Contra, United States v. Criukshank, 25 F.
Cas. 707, 712 (No. 14,896) (C.C. La. 1874),
afl'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). The Jones Court
characterized the position of the Ylodges Court
as irreconcilable with that of every member
of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, and
as inconsistent with its present holding. Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-3
n.78 (1968).
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question. What acts of discrimination can
be characterized as imposing such a
badge? In discussing the authority of
Congress to interpret this phrase, the
Court recalled the words of Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and
all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consistent with
the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.' 1 7
The final question then is whether it is
rational for Congress to consider a pri-
vate act of discrimination as the imposi-
tion of a relic or badge of slavery. An
understanding of Mr. Justice Harlan's
dissent in the Civil Rights Cases compels
an affirmative answer. A recognition that
slavery as an institution rested directly
upon the Dred Scott concept of the black
American's racial inferiority leads neces-
sarily to the conclusion that all discrim-
ination based on this concept is indeed
a badge of slavery.""
The Jones Court refused to decide
whether the thirteenth amendment itself
abolished the badges and incidents of
slavery, stating that the question was not
presented in the instant case." 0 An in-
terpretation of the thirteenth amendment
117 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
118 Mr. Justice Douglas adopted this position
in his concurring opinion in Jones. He ad-
monished the dissent for raising distinctions
which "have no place in the jurisprudence of
a nation striving to rejoin the human race."
392 U.S. at 449 n.6.
119 392 U.S. at 439.
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as self-executing, prohibiting all badges
and incidents of slavery by its own force
and effect, would enable the judiciary to
prohibit private discrimination even in
the absence of federal legislation.12 -
While the judiciary would be free to sus-
tain any legislation prohibiting private
discrimination which it regarded as ra-
tional for Congress to believe imposed
badges of slavery, it would have to find
that the acts of discrimination actually
did impose badges of slavery before it
could act in the absence of ancillary leg-
islation.1 t Thus a petitioner seeking relief
under the thirteenth amendment itself if
the self-executing interpretation is adopt-
ed would have to establish that no rea-
sonable man could disagree that the acts
involved imposed badges of slavery. Such
a standard is certainly more difficult to
fulfill than the simple Congressional ra-
tionality test; yet it should be recognized
that this standard is not insurmount-
able.1 2  The burden would be appreciably
lightened when the petitioner could point
to a particular public policy or interest
which would be vindicated if his suit
were to succeed. For instance, in view
of the prominent public interests served
120The judiciary has assumed such a role
under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966).
122 For a discussion of possible litigation under
the thirteenth amendment to compel develop-
ment of governmental plans to eliminate the
urban ghettos and other badges of slavery, see
Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom Revisited: Some First Thoughts on
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company 22 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 537, 549-52 (1968).
by open housing, the petitioners would
most likely succeed in a suit under the
thirteenth amendment, even if the 1866
Act had never been enacted. The Jones
Court did not state that it was rational
for Congress to assume that a denial of
the right to acquire property would im-
pose a badge of slavery. Rather, it stated
quite affirmatively, "And when racial dis-
crimination herds men into ghettos and
makes their ability to buy property turn
on the color of their skin, then it too is
a relic of slavery." 123
For the present, however, the Court
has denied the judiciary even this limited
role in the delineation of the badges of
slavery present in our society. This may
reflect the Court's recognition that this
area of conflicting rights is an extremely
sensitive one, one whose scope and im-
plementation can best be defined by leg-
islation rather than adjudication. 2 1 The
Court may have concluded that the pub-
lic policy questions raised in this arel
can best be answered by Congress, the
elected representatives of the nation,
rather than by the judiciary. Whether
the Court will retain this philosophy will
depend in part upon the caliber of Con-
gress' response to the role which the
Court has created for it.125
123 392 U.S. at 442-3.
124 See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adju-
dication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 114 (1966).
121 Title VIII, the fair housing section of the
1968 Civil Rights Act, its relationship to the
1866 Act, and the constitutional obstacles con-
fronting it, will be discussed in Part I of
this article, which will appear in a future issue
of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.
